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SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: STATUTORY REFORM OR
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INTRODUCTION
During the last twenty years, as the global financial markets have
become increasingly interdependent, the problem of sovereign debt
has become more pronounced. Simultaneously, irresponsible lending
practices and unwise investment strategies have led to several well-
publicized financial "crises." A solution is needed to improve the effi-
ciency of the international financial market, to encourage wiser in-
vestment, and to offer a method of market stabilization when events
reduce the likelihood of sovereign debt repayment. This Comment
addresses whether that solution can be provided through private ne-
gotiation or whether a new, intergovernmental structure must be ef-
fected.
The problem of sovereign debt has been the subject of significant
academic debate.' Indeed, two competing proposals for dealing with
the restructuring of sovereign debt recently have come to the fore.
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Compare Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sover-
eigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002) (providing an
outline of the intellectual predecessors to the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM) proposal placed within the purview of bankruptcy law during 2001), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf, and Steven
L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1030-31 (2000) (developing the idea of an intergovernmental
bankruptcy procedure), with Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the
Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1358 n.87 (listing sources that support collective ac-
tion clauses), and BARRY EICHENGREEN & ASHOKA MODY, WOULD COLLECTIVE ACTION
CLAUSES RAISE BORROwING COSTS? 22-23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7458, 2000) (characterizing collective action clauses as beneficial), available
at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7458.pdf.
(1483)
1484 UNIVERSITY OF PENNS YL VANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152: 1483
One proposal, advocated by the U.S. Treasury Department, encour-
ages lenders to include collective action clauses in their debt instru-• 2
ments as a method of dealing with potential debt restructuring. The
other position, advocated by some at the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) (particularly fund director, Anne Krueger), suggests that mar-
ket participants adopt a statutory scheme to deal with the problem.
This statutory scheme has been labeled the sovereign debt restructur-
ing mechanism (SDRM). 4
While both proposals had their share of supporters and detrac-
tors, the IMF's SDRM received a substantial blow during the fund's
spring meeting of 2003. During this meeting, Treasury SecretaryJohn
Snow cited market moves toward collective action clauses and con-
cluded that it was "neither necessary nor feasible to continue working
on SDRM."5 Such a position by the United States, the largest con-
tributor to the IMF, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to implement
anything like the SDRM.6 In fact, this pronouncement by Secretary
Snow has caused at least one source to declare that the SDRM is "offi-
cially dead."' Although these developments significantly impair the
likelihood of implementing anything that resembles the SDRM in the
near future, the inherent flaws of a market-based approach coupled
with the growing recognition of the need for a more systematic proc-
ess indicate that we are at the beginning, not at the end, of this de-
bate.
This Comment focuses the debate over these two proposed solu-
tions to the sovereign debt crisis. Its purpose is to identify the theory
underlying these competing solutions. Bankruptcy law is not a mono-
lithic legal theory. Rather, it encompasses societal values concerning
who should bear the financial loss that inevitably results from insol-
vency. The ensuing discussion rests on the premise that a better
2 See infra Part III (describing the Treasury Department's market-based approach).
3 See infra Part II (describing the IMF's innovative approach).
4 Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach
to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address Before the National Economists' Club An-
nual Members' Dinner (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2001/1 12601.h tm.
5 John W. Snow, Statement at the Meeting of the International Monetary and Fi-
nancial Committee (Apr. 12, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/spring/
2003/imfc/state/eng/usa.htm.
6 See Dan Taylor, The International Monetary Fund: Wallet Sore to the West or Savior to
the Global Financial Crisis, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 79 (1999) (recognizing that
the United States has more voting power than any other member nation because it is
the largest contributor to the IMF).
SDRM Is Dead, and That's Official, EUROMONEY, May 2003, at 102, 102.
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evaluation of the competing proposals for dealing with sovereign debt
can be achieved by examining them in the context of bankruptcy the-
ory.
This Comment addresses the problem as follows: Part I gives an
overview of sovereign debt and examines the historical methods for
dealing with financial crises when a sovereign defaults on its loans.
Part II explores a recent statutory proposal advanced by the IMF,
which is designed to create the functional equivalent of an interna-
tional bankruptcy court. Part III examines an alternative, market-
based approach to dealing with sovereign debt that is currently advo-
cated by the U.S. Treasury Department. Part IV considers the compet-
ing axioms present in bankruptcy law generally while Part V analyzes
both the statutory and market-based approaches for evidence of the
tensions present in modern bankruptcy theory. Part VI concludes by
recommending a traditionalist-based approach to solving the sover-
eign debt crisis. This conclusion results from the unique nature of
sovereign debt explored in some detail here and in the concerns ad-
dressed by the SDRM, but ignored by the Treasury Department pro-
posal.
I. RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT
A. History of Sovereign Debt
Sovereign debt can be defined as the "debt incurred by govern-
ments, typically those of developing countries, to foreign investors
seeking a competitive return."" Notably, this definition excludes sev-
eral other types of financing available in the international financial
market such as government debt to public institutions, private borrow-
ing in international capital markets, and direct foreign investment.9
A good starting point for the analysis of sovereign debt is an
inquiry into why an independent country, with internal sources of
financing, would need to borrow money from foreigners. First,
no country has an inexhaustible supply of resources available for
investment. Countries face the same economic choices confronting
8 JONATHAN EATON & RAQUEL FERNANDEZ, SOVEREIGN DEBT I (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5131, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w5131 .pdf.
9 Id. at 1 n.2. These forms of financing are typically excluded from a discussion of
sovereign debt restructuring because each of them has its own enforcement mecha-
nisms and does not suffer from the unique problems associated with sovereign debt.
See infra Part I.B (describing the signature attributes of sovereign debt).
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individuals and corporations in a world of scarcity. A country must
decide how much of its resource supply to consume and how much of
its resource supply to invest in the hope of increasing future consump-
tion. At the same time, the level of current consumption necessarily
constrains the resources available for investment. Borrowing, there-
fore, allows a country to increase the resources available for invest-
ment without having to forgo current consumption. A country can
borrow capital for investment, and as long as the value of the goods
produced by that capital exceeds the cost of acquiring external capi-
tal, it is in the country's long-term economic interest to do so.10
Mirroring the incentives for countries to borrow are the incentives
for creditors to lend. These incentives are typically divided into fac-
tors that are external and those that are internal or specific to the
borrowing country." External factors include lower average interest
rates, economic slowdowns in more developed countries (a factor that
limits investment opportunities in those markets), and a growing
trend among all investors toward diversification of investments
through international markets. 12 Internal factors include the adop-
tion of sound monetary and fiscal policies by some developing coun-
tries and active promotion of improved debtor/creditor relation-
ships.3 The incentives for creditors to lend and for debtors to borrow
together create the market for sovereign debt.
10 See Gunter Dufey, Corporate Debt vs. Country Debt: Distinguishing Between Liquidity
and Solvency Problems, in PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS TO THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT
PROBLEM 35, 37 (Robert Grosse ed., 1992) (justifying long-term borrowing for sover-
eign nations "whenever the additional goods and services created by the additional in-
vestment exceed the (risk-adjusted) cost of external funds"). At this point, the consid-
erations for countries are remarkably similar to the investment considerations for a
corporation. A corporation borrows money to finance projects that have positive net
present values. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STUART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 18-22 (7th ed. 2003) (explaining that, in making an investment
decision, investors, on a general level, and corporations, more specifically, often aspire
to follow the "net present value rule" by investing in a project with positive net present
value).
I See Guillermo A. Calvo et al., Inflows of Capital to Developing Countries in the 1990s,
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1996, at 123, 125-28 (1996) (listing and briefly describing the
factors involved in investment decisions affecting the inflow of capital into the develop-
ing countries of Latin America and Asia).
12 Id. at 126-27.
13 Id. at 127-28.
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B. The Unique Aspects of Sovereign Debt
With the above understanding of sovereign debt in mind, I now
consider the unique problems that arise when a country is unable or
refuses to pay its debts. A vast literature (comprised of mostly econo-
mists' contributions) devotes itself to the deceptively simple question
of why a country repays its debts. 4 An examination of all the pro-
posed conclusions in that literature is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. However, the inquiry highlights major distinctions between
sovereign debt and corporate debt. Ultimately, three characteristics
distinguish the two types of debt.
First, at least in an abstract sense, a country can always service its
debt, which makes it difficult to determine if a country is ever "insol-
vent." A company repays its debts because it must. If a company fails
to repay its debts, the business can be dismantled by the unpaid credi-
tors.' 5 However, no parallel mechanism exists to force repayment by
sovereign nations since no creditor has the ability to dismantle or liq-
uidate a country. As a result, collection remedies against countries
remain extraordinarily complex and difficult to execute.
Furthermore, a corporation's ability to service its debt'6 is un-
doubtedly a methodical question, based primarily on the value of the
14 See Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289, 289-90 (1981) (proposing a reputa-
tional model to describe why countries repay debt). But see Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth
Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 97J. POL. ECON. 155, 157-58
(1989) (noting some of the reputational model's limitations).
15 "Unsecured debt" is defined as "debt not supported by collateral or other secu-
rity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (7th ed. 1999). "Secured debt" is defined as "debt
backed by collateral." Id. The traditional state law method of enforcing unsecured
debt when the debtor has defaulted is to sue the debtor in civil court. See JAMESJ.
WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 14 (2d ed.
1992) (describing briefly the history and modem forms of enforcing debt). Having
satisfactorily demonstrated the existence of a debt and the debtor's failure to pay the
debt, the creditor can obtain a writ of execution that allows her to request the local
sheriff's services for seizure and sale of the property. Id. When debt is secured, the
creditor does not need to use the courts to claim the property securing the debtor's
obligation, if the property can be secured without breach of the peace. Id. at 23. Oth-
erwise, the procedure for recovery will be similar to that of unsecured debt. If state
remedies prove unworkable, creditors can force the liquidation of a corporation
through federal bankruptcy laws. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2000) (detailing the proc-
ess of liquidation in bankruptcy proceedings); WHITE & NIMMER, supra, at 59 (intro-
ducing Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, under which "[t]he trustee simply collects
the assets of the debtor, sells them, and distributes the proceeds to the creditors").
16 See Dufey, supra note 10, at 45 n.2 ("Debt service is defined simply as the timely
payment of interest.").
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firm's assets and the burden of its obligations. 7 While a sovereign's
ability to service its debt initially invokes a similar inquiry, it also
involves political, social, and even moral questions."' Rarely, if ever,
though, is a country unable to meet its obligations in the same way aS • 19
corporation is unable to meet its obligations. In almost all cases, a
government can repay its loans as scheduled by diverting funds from
other projects or by increasing taxes.2 0 The problem with this conclu-
sion is that a country will always reach a point beyond which the costs
of servicing its debts exceed the costs of defaulting on its obligations.2 1
Because of the elusive character of this calculation, it seems impossi-
ble to predict when this point will be reached. Furthermore, each
change in political leadership presents a potentially different calculus
for determining the costs of defaulting on sovereign debt.
The second difference between corporate and sovereign debt,
therefore, is that a country can use little (if anything) to secure debt
in the traditional sense. As a consequence, most sovereign debt re-
mains "unsecured," which further frustrates collection remedies. In
the corporate financing context, one of the major justifications for
secured debt "is the desire to increase the likelihood of payment in
the event of bankruptcy.",2 Although there has been an ongoing de-
23bate over the value of secured debt generally, secured debt plays a
major role in corporate bankruptcies. The absence of secured debt in
17 See WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 15, at 52 (recognizing that, when assets are in-
adequate to pay debts, troubled firms are dealt with through bankruptcy laws).
" See Jack Boorman, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Where Stands the Debate?,
Speech at a Conference Cosponsored by the Cato Institute and The Economist (Oct. 17,
2002) (describing the political, social, and moral threshold beyond which a country
cannot justify further financial constraints), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/speeches/2002/101702.htm.
19 This belief has led certain investors to comment that "'countries never go bank-
rupt."' Jeffrey D. Sachs, Introduction to DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY 1, 8 (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989) (quoting Citicorp Chairman Walter Wriston
who justified heavy international lending with this rationale).
20 See Boorman, supra note 18 ("Debt can almost always be serviced in some ab-
stract sense, through additional taxation and through the diversion of yet more domes-
tic production to exports to generate the revenue and foreign exchange needed to
service the debt.").
21 See id. (acknowledging a threshold limitation to a country's willingness to service
debt).
22 Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security In-
terests: Taking Debtors'Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2067 (1994).
23 See Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436,
1437 (1997) (examining "[t]he debate over the social value of secured credit" and in-
quiring when and why finns issue secured debt).
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the sovereign debt context limits the suitability of using domestic
bankruptcy law as a model for sovereign debt restructuring.
Third, "the ability of a court to force a sovereign entity to comply
with its wishes is extremely limited. 2 4 Asjust explained, the traditional
state law methods of debt collection"5 are not applicable to sovereign
debt. Further, no intergovernmental agency currently exists to adju-
dicate disputes between creditors and sovereign states.26 The absence
of this structure is a major obstacle to any reorganization plan seeking
implementation of domestic bankruptcy rules in the sovereign debt
context.
C. Historical Approaches to Dealing with Default
In the last twenty years, there have been several periods of "crisis"
during which numerous countries have simultaneously defaulted or
have been in danger of defaulting. These crises have occurred in
27Latin America, Mexico, and most recently, Southeast Asia, and each
has threatened the stability of the global economy, as well as the viabil-
ity of the international financial markets. These debt crises are not
a new phenomenon; similar lending booms and busts arose through-
out the nineteenth century.2s As with more modern debt crises, each
24 EATON & FERNANDEZ, supra note 8, at 2.
25 For a brief description of traditional state law remedies for debt delinquency,
see supra note 15.
26 The absence of an intergovernmental agency or other device to alleviate coor-
dination problems among indebted countries was one of the major impetuses for the
IMF's SDRM proposal. See infra notes 41-45, 53-56 and accompanying text (analyzing
the collective action problem and explaining how the SDRM proposal would poten-
tially resolve the issue).
Generally, three distinct periods of crisis receive attention. In the early 1980s,
Latin American countries were unable to meet their sovereign debt obligations and
began to default. See Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational
Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the
Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 539, 550-54 (1996) (discussing
the origins of the financial crisis that occurred during the 1980s). In 1994, Mexico was
unable to meet its financial obligations and threatened to disrupt all of Central Amer-
ica with its default. See Rory MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 305, 305-07 (1995) (detailing the 1994 financial crisis and the U.S. government's
orchestration of a rescue package totaling over $50 billion). Finally, and most re-
centy, the Southeast Asian markets experienced a financial crisis in 1997. See generally
Duncan E. Williams, Note, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging
Market Nations: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the International Legal
Regime, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 564-70 (2001) (describing the causes of the 1997-
1999 Asian financial crisis).
28 For example, the international community engaged in the practice of signifi-
cant lending to sovereign states as far back as the 1850s, late 1860s, and late 1880s;
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occurrence has been characterized by euphoric increases in lending
to foreign governments and eventual, thundering, and often disas-
trous cessations of that lending.2 9
Despite the recurring problem of sovereign debt repudiation, lit-
tle evidence exists to suggest that "problem debtors" are actually pun-
ished.0  One would expect that problem debtors would at least be
charged a higher interest rate commensurate with their sovereign risk.
On the contrary, defaulting countries seem to obtain similar interest
rates to those countries that repay their debts. For example, "[b]e-
tween 1976 and 1979... the same interest premia were charged to
those Third World countries that had repaid faithfully in the past and
those who had not."3 ' Left unchecked, the problem seems destined to
repeat itself.
History notwithstanding, there is a growing sense that financial
32crises have become more severe in recent years. As financial markets
become more integrated, problems in one country can mean prob-
lems for an entire region, if not the world. In recognition of this real-
ity, intergovernmental organizations like the IMF and the World Bank
have sought to intervene in these financial crises, often by "bailing
out" the defaulting country. Yet these bailouts have been provided on
continued the practice from 1904 to 1914; and reinstituted it again in the late 1920s.
See Peter H. Lindert & PeterJ. Morton, How Sovereign Debt Has Worked, in DEVELOPING
COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 225, 226 (charting the
history of sovereign debt repayment from the early nineteenth century to the 1920s).
See id. ("Each wave ended with at least some occurrence of repayments break-
down, sometimes because of international trade depression, sometimes because of
government budget crises, and sometimes because of revelation of financial abuses.").
30 See id. at 232 (examining the historical data and finding no perceivable punish-
ment for "problem debtors").
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Desmond Lachman, Letter to the Editor, IMF Should Blow the Whistle,
FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1, 2003, at 2 (noting that the lack of access limits on IMF lending
since 1995 has resulted in "moral hazard" lending, which "has tended to delay debt
crises and to make them more severe when they eventually occur"). But see Ross P.
Buckley, A Tale of Two Crises: The Search for the Enduring Reforms of the International Fi-
nancial System, 6 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 3 n.2 (2001) (arguing, with re-
spect to large-scale multinational crises, that "[t]he [Latin American] debt crisis [of
the 1980s] brought the international financial system to the edge of total collapse-the
Asian crisis [of the 1990s] had no such effect"); Pdivi Munter, Index Puts Price on Politi-
cal Risk: Record Emerging Markets Investment Has Prompted a Stability Tracker, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2004, at 43 ("For the moment, analysts consider the risk of a systemic calamity
in emerging markets low. This is because of more prudent fiscal policies in emerging
countries. Many of them have also dismantled fixed currency regimes, a trigger for
several previous debt crises.").
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a provisional basis, with most coming from the IMF.3  Furthermore,
some argue that these bailouts increase not only the cost of default,
but also the likelihood of future defaults.34
Consequently, there is growing recognition of the need for a more
systematic, less ad hoc approach to the problem of sovereign risk. Al-
though some still argue that the international financial market works
best without governmental interference,3 5 most observers recognize
the need for reform.' Criticisms of IMF bailouts have led some schol-
ars to look for new methods of dealing with the sovereign risk prob-
lem. This Comment will examine two such approaches, one pro-
posed by IMF Director Anne Krueger and the other supported by the
U.S. Treasury Department.
II. THE NEW APPROACH OF THE IMF
IMF Director Anne Krueger has proposed an innovative solution
to the problem of sovereign debt.5s Her plan, summarized in an IMF
pamphlet published in April of 2002, supports the adoption of an
SDRM.3 9 The SDRM would involve a statutory creation functioning
much like an international bankruptcy court. The IMF pamphlet out-
lines the structural framework of the SDRM, the costs and benefits
of the plan, and the appropriate legal basis for the restructuring
33 See generally Milena D. Makich-Macias, Note, The Effect of the International Monetary
Fund Bailout on Emerging Growth Countries, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1755, 1764-79 (2001)
(describing IMF bailouts in the 1990s involving Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia).
34 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 957 (warning that IMF lending potentially creates
a "moral hazard" that would increase the likelihood of future default).
35 See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF's Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort,
CATOJ., Winter 1998, at 275, 275-90 (criticizing IMF intervention as a misguided reac-
tion to financial crises).
36 See, e.g., Lindert & Morton, supra note 28, at 234 ("Countries that had defaulted
in the past were significantly more likely to become problem debtors again. Yet de-
faulting governments have seldom been punished, either with direct sanctions or with
discriminatory denial of later credit.").
37 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 966-67 (arguing for the adoption of an inter-
national convention for sovereign debt restructuring); see also Rogoff & Zettelmeyer,
supra note 1 (giving a broad overview of the intellectual predecessors to the SDRM
proposal). The SDRM proposal, infra Part II, and the market-based approach, infra
Part III, also emerged during this time of disagreement.
38 Anne Krueger first introduced this proposal in 2001. Krueger, supra note 4.
39 ANNE 0. KRUEGER, INT'L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN
DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/
sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.
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mechanism. The following description is derived primarily from this
pamphlet.w
A. The Primary Concerns of the IME
The IMF identifies four core problems that the SDRM seeks to
solve: the collective action problem, sovereigns' inability to bind mi-
nority creditors, fears concerning intercreditor equity, and finally, the
problem of financing during the restructuring period.
The first problem the IMF considers pertains to the method for
financing sovereign debt.41 No longer are sovereigns indebted to sev-
eral large banks. Now traded securities serve as the primary means of
financing sovereign debt.42 While this arrangement has improved the
efficiency of the international financial market, 43 it creates significant
coordination problems for countries attempting to restructure their
debt. These complications represent a collective action problem,
44
which operates as follows. While it might be in the interests of all the
creditors to negotiate collectively with the sovereign and restructure
debt, it is in the interest of each individual creditor to hold out for a
time. By holding out, the lone creditor hopes to force the sovereign
to pay its obligation fully, while only partially paying its obligations
to other creditors. The collective action problem thus stands as a sig-
nificant barrier to sovereigns attempting to restructure their debt
through negotiations with creditors. 45
40 As this plan was debated and the political and practical obstacles to the SDRM
emerged, compromises and refinements were included in the IMF plan. See INT'L
MONETARY FUND, PIN No. 03/06, IMF BOARD DISCUSSES POSSIBLE FEATURES OF A
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM (2003) (describing various concerns
with the SDRM and methods for dealing with these concerns), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pnO306.htm. The original proposal provides the
foundation for the analysis in this Comment.
41 See KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 6-9 (describing the origins and characteristics of
the collective action problem).
42 See id. at 6 (noting the past decade's "shift away from syndicated bank loans to-
ward traded securities as the principal vehicle for the extension of financial credits to
sovereigns").
43 Id.
44 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 960-61 (explaining the collective action problem).
45 It should be clear that, in the days before traded securities, when there were
fewer creditors, the impact of the collective action problem was less pronounced.
Other factors have similarly diminished the problem of collective action in the past.
These factors include "the relative homogeneity of commercial bank creditors, the
contractual provisions of syndicated loans, and.., moral suasion applied by supervi-
sory authorities." KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 6 (footnote omitted).
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A second, related problem is that sovereigns lack the ability to
46
bind minority creditors. Even if a sovereign were able to overcome
the collective action problem and work out a restructuring plan with
all the major creditors, the sovereign would still have no mechanism
for compelling smaller, minority creditors to accept the restructured
deal. Smaller creditors "may consider that their best interests would
be served by trying to free ride in the hope of ultimately receiving
payments in line with their original contracts." 47 Minority holdouts,
however, create uncertainty in the restructuring process. Thus, with-
out the ability to bind minority creditors, sovereigns are extremely
limited in their capacity to restructure debt.
Creditors' fears about intercreditor equity pose the third major
barrier to restructured workouts.48 Creditors worry that debtors will
make payments to favored creditors, effectively reducing the amount
available for those who remain.) The IMF suggests that this fear will
prevent any creditor from entering into negotiations with a sovereign
absent guarantees that preferences will not be paid. 0
One final problem discussed by the IMF involves financing during
the restructuring period.5' A country, like any corporation, needs
money to operate during the restructuring period, as well as finances
to implement the restructuring plan. If this type of financing is not
given priority status, little incentive exists for creditors to loan money
to sovereigns who are in default. Such a disincentive could impair
the restructuring process.
See id. at 7 ("The absence of a mechanism that provides for majority action
among a diverse set of creditors is a primary source of difficulties with collective ac-
tion.").
47 Id. at 8.
48 See id. at 8, 16 (addressing the need to protect creditor interests).
See id. at 8-9 ("[C]oncerns about inter-creditor equity stemming from debtors'
decisions to make payments to certain favored creditors after suspending payments on
other creditors may introduce delays.").
See id. at 16 (recognizing that, in order to protect creditors' interests, the SDRM
must ensure that the sovereign debtor will be prohibited from making payments to
nonpriority creditors).
51 See id. at 17 (discussing the problems in the current "legal framework" that pri-
ority financing would eliminate).
52 See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing,
46 VAND. L. REv. 901, 901-28 (1993) (examining debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing
and its relative importance in the bankruptcy scheme).
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B. The SDRM Proposal
The IMF's proposed solution to these problems suggests creating
a mechanism it calls the SDRM, which would function similarly to U.S.
bankruptcy courts. In the corporate debt context, bankruptcy courts
address many of the same structural issues that plague sovereign debt
including collective action problems, minority holdouts, intercreditor
equity, and financing during the restructuring period. Ultimately, the
goal of the IMF, through its SDRM program, is to create "a predict-
able, orderly, and rapid process for restructuring the debts of sover-
eigns. ' 53 The IMF has borrowed several key components of U.S. bank-
ruptcy law that it believes will help in achieving this goal. To oversee
the SDRM process, the IMF proposed the creation of an international
bankruptcy court, over which the IMF will have control and over-
sight.'4
"[T] he most important element of any new restructuring frame-
work" would be a mechanism to allow "a qualified majority of credi-
tors" to bind minority creditors.5 Thus, the IMF plan recognizes the
collective action problem as the most significant barrier to sovereign
debt restructuring. The IMF utilizes a bankruptcy-like arrangement as
it proves one of the few methods for avoiding the collective action
problem.56
To deal with the minority holdout issue, the IMF proposes a stay
on litigation by creditors during any restructuring period.5' This re-
quirement remains curious because, as the IMF recognizes, litigation
against sovereigns is rarely effective. 8 Nevertheless, the IMF proposal
53 KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 2.
54 Id. at 23.
55 Id. at 14.
56 This approach by the IMF is, to some degree, self-serving. As noted later in this
Comment, infra Part III, many feel it is possible to simply contract out of the collective
action problem. Adopting the IMF proposal ensures future IMF intervention in inter-
national financial crises, which may or may not be beneficial. One of the major criti-
cisms of the IMF plan is that it gives the IMF too many new powers. See, e.g., Battling
over the Bankrupt, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 70, 70-71 ("[B]ankers and politicians
complained that this idea gave the IMF too much power ... "). Responding to such
criticism, the IMF altered its original proposal in an attempt to place the focus on
creditors and to limit the focus on the IMF. Supra note 40.
57 See KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 15-16 (pointing out the benefits of implement-
ing a temporary stay on creditor litigation after a suspension of payments).
58 See id. at 16 ("The risk of widespread creditor litigation may be less pronounced
in the sovereign than in the corporate context, largely on account of the relative scar-
city of assets under the jurisdiction of foreign courts that could be seized to satisfy
creditors' claims.").
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suggests that the mere possibility of litigation could be sufficient to
hamper restructuring efforts because the uncertainty created by pend-
ing litigation might prevent creditors from restructuring.
59
The IMF is not alone in proposing a stay on litigation in the sov-
ereign debt arena. Indeed, some of the other leading proposals advo-
cating for an international bankruptcy scheme also include stay provi-
sions. It is unclear how necessary these provisions ultimately are
when the threat of litigation is so small. Thus, the implementation of
a stay might be an example of the inherent problems associated with
analogizing between corporate finance and sovereign financing. In
contrast to sovereign debt scenarios, stay provisions are vital to corpo-
rate bankruptcy proceedings because the threat of litigation is very
real and those creditors who quickly file suit to recover on defaulted
loans can potentially dismantle even viable companies.
The IMF proposal additionally requires that the SDRM balance
the interests of creditors outside of a litigation context. The sovereign
would first be prevented from making any payments to nonpriority
creditors.6 ' Further, the IMF would have oversight and control over
the sovereign's ability to exhaust resources, which would serve to reas-
sure creditors that the debtor will "conduct policies in a fashion that
preserves asset values. 62  Finally, the SDRM would grant priority to
63creditors giving new money during the stay period. Without this pri-
ority feature, there would be no incentive for a creditor to lend to a
debtor in default. Providing priority to these creditors encourages a
market for restructuring financing and facilitates the entire restructur-
64
ing process.
59 See id. at 13 (arguing that, although litigation in this context is rare, the evolu-
tion of legal strategies has increased the uncertainties of post-default restructurings).
60 See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 984-85 & nn.164-71 (citing various arguments raised
by scholars for the inclusion of a stay provision).
61 See KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 16 ("[T]he sovereign debtor would be required
not to make payments to nonpriority creditors."). Priority creditors are those creditors
who have a right to be paid before any other creditors of the debtor. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1212. Nonpriority creditors must wait until all the prior-
ity claims are satisfied before they can recover any debts.
62 KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 16.
63 Id. at 17.
64 The concept of priority financing mirrors current domestic bankruptcy law.
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes certain post-petition financing to be given super-
priority status over all other claims prioritized in section 507. 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c),
503(b), 507 (2000); see also WHITE & NIMMER, supra note 15, at 202-03 (reviewing the
priority levels of financing).
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These elements of the SDRM are designed to create a "predict-
able, orderly, and rapid process" of sovereign debt restructuring to ac-
cord with the IMF's ultimate goal.66 In addition to the SDRM's spe-
cific elements, the IMF plan anticipates that the mere existence of the
SDRM will itself encourage independent negotiations between credi-
tors and sovereigns without having to resort to its complex proce-
dures.6 6
The IMF concludes its proposal by advocating implementation of
the SDRM "through the establishment of universal treaty obliga-
tions. ", 7 The IMF argues that this approach is superior to one in
which each sovereign independently enacts legislation to approve the
adoption of the SDRM.6 A universal treaty will insure uniformity be-
cause it will not be subject to the interpretation of each country's leg-
islature (or other ruling body). The IMF further contends that, with-
out universal obligations, a disincentive for each individual country to
adopt the SDRM would emerge because the first few adopters may
worry that its enactment signals a lack of confidence in their ability to
repay sovereign debt.69 Adopting a universal treaty will have the effect
of simultaneously enacting a uniform mechanism for dealing with
sovereign debt.
C. Reaction to the IMFApproach
While the IMF proposal has been well received in many coun-
tries, 7° some still believe that the plan is unrealistic or, even worse, det-
rimental to international financial markets.] Some critics voice skep-
72ticism over the creation of an international bankruptcy court.
65 Supra text accompanying note 53.
66 KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 4.
67 Id. at 33.
68 Id.
69 These countries' concerns center around a "free rider" problem. Id. at 34. Ab-
sent universal treaty obligations, the first countries to adopt the SDRM will bear the
risk that creditors will not approve of SDRM provisions and thus will penalize the
adopting countries through higher interest rates and/or reduced lending.
70 See Felix Salmon, Market Resists Restructuring Reform, EUROMONEY, Oct. 2002, at
18 (stating that, at a recent IMF meeting, the SDRM proposal was "endorsed by every-
one who matters").
71 See id. at 18-19 (identifying private sector opposition and borrowers' concerns).
72 See Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem
of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 159, 174
(2000) (recognizing that, because sovereigns will not likely relinquish power to any
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Others see more fundamental flaws in the SDRM. If the SDRM is ef-
fective in its stated goal of producing a predictable, orderly, and rapid
restructuring process, it will have the simultaneous effect of reducing
the cost of default.73 Creditors fear that reducing the cost of default
will ultimately encourage sovereign nations to default.7 4  Further,
debtors (sovereign borrowers) fear that creditor concerns about the
reduced cost of default will mean an increase in the cost of borrowing
to offset the perceived increased risk of default.
75
Several authors have suggested that countries are supporting the
SDRM as a means to achieve what they really want, which is the inclu-
sion of collective action clauses in debt instruments provided to de-
veloping countries.76 It is important to note that there is a significant
difference in the approach taken by the IMF (and the countries which
support the SDRM) and that taken by the users of the system, the
creditors and debtors, who have rejected the system outright. The us-
ers of the system view the primary benefit of the SDRM, increased
predictability with a subsequent reduction in the cost of defaulting, as
its biggest flaw because the users are concerned that this situation will
encourage sovereign nations to default on their debt (and ultimately
raise the cost of borrowing).
III. MARKET-BASED APPROACH
A. The Treasury Department and Collective Action Clauses
The day after the IMF announced its ambitious plan to enact an
international bankruptcy court, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
responded with its own ideas about the proper way to solve future sov-
ereign debt crises. The Treasury Department plan, presented by Sec-
retary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill, rejected the idea that an SDRM or
any other statutory solution was necessary to address future economic
international body, an international bankruptcy court will face enforcement prob-
lems).
73 See Salmon, supra note 70, at 18, 20 (listing the unintended and undesirable
consequences of the SDRM).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 20.
76 Battling over the Bankrupt, supra note 56, at 70 ("Nobody knows if rich coun-
tries.., are merely using the SDRM threat to corral investors and emerging-market
countries into accepting collective-action clauses.").
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concerns. 77 The Treasury Department, convinced about the virtue of
market solutions,7 s proposed the idea of encouraging creditors and
debtors to rewrite the way bonds were written in an attempt to alter
79the terms under which countries borrowed money.
Just like the IMF's SDRM proposal, the Treasury Department's
plan was not uniquely conceived.0 Similar ideas have been examined
in academic journals over the past several years."' In fact, some of the
major criticisms of the Treasury Department's plan claim that it is
identical to a 1996 G-10 proposal that proved unworkable and that it
is simply an old plan regurgitated. 2
The Treasury Department has chosen to emphasize a different set
of concerns than the IMF. According to the Treasury Department,
the primary problem with sovereign debt restructuring is the lack of a
77 See The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Report to Congress on International Economic
and Exchange Rate Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Af-
fairs, 107th Cong. 52 (2002) (statement of Secretary Paul H. O'Neill, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury) (testifying that the Bush administration advocates a "market-oriented ap-
proach to the sovereign debt restructuring process").
78 See id. ("The swift removal of barriers in key markets will help strengthen finan-
cial systems internationally.").
79 Id.
80 See Rogoff & Zettelmeyer, supra note 1 (surveying the intellectual history of sov-
ereign debt restructuring proposals).
81 See, e.g., Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1358 n.87 (identifying a number of
sources that support the use of collective action clauses); EICHENGREEN & MODY, supra
note 1, at 22-23 (noting the benefits of collective action clauses).
See Michelle J. White, Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?, 2002
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 287, 308 (criticizing the collective action clause
proposal on the grounds that international financial institutions have been advocating
similar solutions for years, "with little effect"). "To answer the objection that the cur-
rent [Treasury Department] position is not much different from the line taken in the
Rey Report of the G-10... the US Treasury proposed adding substantial 'carrots and
sticks' as incentives to change." MARCUS MILLER, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING:
NEW ARTICLES, NEW CON-TRACTS-OR No CHANGE? 6 (Inst. for Int'l Econ., Int'l Econ.
Policy Briefs No. PB02-3, 2002), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/frame/pbeifrm.
html. The G-10 proposal surfaced after the Mexican financial crisis in 1996 and pro-
posed the inclusion of collective action clauses into bond contracts, with the IMF serv-
ing as a backstop. GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES:
A REPORT TO THE MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
DEPUTIES 3, 53-56 (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf; MILLER,
supra, at 11. The government also verbally responded to the criticisms. See John B.
Taylor, Using Clauses to Reform the Process for Sovereign Debt Workouts: Progress
and Next Steps, Remarks at the EMTA Annual Meeting (Dec. 5, 2002) (arguing that
"not all old ideas are bad" and deflecting criticism by stating that the Treasury De-
partment proposal "went well beyond traditional collective action clauses"), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3672.htm.
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process to restructure debt.s3 With no process in place, investors are
unable to adequately assess the cost of default. Without this informa-
tion, not only are bonds priced inaccurately, but great uncertainty
ensues when a country has debts that are unmanageable. With that
latter concern in mind, the more modest goal of the Treasury De-
partment is to "reduce the uncertainty that now surrounds restructur-
ings.
8 4
The Treasury Department does not specify the kind of restructur-
ing procedure it would like to see implemented. Having faith in the
market system, the Treasury Department leaves the terms of the proc-
ess up to the individual creditors and debtor nations. Major statutory
reforms are not required, nor is the creation of an international bank-
ruptcy court. If debtors and creditors are given incentives to include
contractual provisions relating to restructuring in their loans, uncer-
tainty will be reduced, and the markets will function more efficiently
815(and, hopefully, with fewer defaults).
According to the Treasury Department, the creation "of a clear,
well-defined [restructuring] process ' '86 can be accomplished contrac-
tually (i.e., without major statutory revisions). The Treasury Depart-
ment proposes the inclusion of three different types of clauses into
bonds used to finance sovereign debt. The first of these clauses is a
collective action clause, which is designed to "allow a super-majority of
bondholders to alter the key financial terms of a bond."' While the
Treasury Department does not define which financial terms would be
subject to the collective action clause, a review of the academic litera-
ture suggests that "financial terms" refers to either a change in the
due date for the payment of a bond's principal or interest or a reduc-
tion of the interest or principal on the bond. 8 Currently, these finan-
cial terms cannot be changed in over seventy percent of the bonds
83 See Taylor, supra note 82 (suggesting that the lack of a definitive process for
dealing with sovereign debt presents "a design weakness.., that impedes broader par-
ticipation in the market").
84 John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at
the Conference, Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards?, Institute for International
Economics (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm.
85 But see supra Part II.B (discussing the alternative IMF solution that encourages
the implementation of uniform obligations, rather than individual contractual provi-
sions, in an effort to overcome the collective action problem).
86 Taylor, supra note 82.
87 Id.
See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges,
48 UCLA L. REv. 59, 63 (2000) (noting the use of these financial terms in "consensual
restructuring" of bonds).
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outstanding to sovereign nations. However, if creditors included the
authority to alter such terms in their bonds, then the cost of coordi-
nating negotiations during restructuring would be significantly re-
duced.
The second type of clause the Treasury Department wants in-
cluded in all newly issued debt instruments provided to emerging
markets is an engagement clause.90 This clause is designed to "de-
scrib[e] the process through which debtors and creditors come to-
gether in the event of a restructuring, "9 giving debtors and creditors
the opportunity to flesh out some of the specific details regarding the
actual process of restructuring. The Treasury Department suggests
that this clause could include the designation of a creditor representa-
tive-an individual or group of individuals chosen to negotiate on be-
half of all the creditors 2-who would have the exclusive right to initi-
ate litigation against the sovereign.93 This provision, like that of the
IMF proposal,94 appears to be designed to attack the minority holdout
problem. In addition, the engagement clause could be used to specify
both the information the debtor must provide to the creditor repre-
sentative and the timeframe for providing that information. The im-
plementation of this clause will likely establish specific guidelines for
the parties to follow.
Finally, the Treasury Department is advocating for the inclusion of
what it calls an initiation clause.99 This clause describes the procedure
89 See Taylor, supra note 82 (recognizing that only about thirty percent of current
emerging-market sovereign bonds include collective action clauses).
go In his April 2002 remarks, John Taylor described what an engagement clause
should entail but did not refer to it by the name "engagement clause." See Taylor, su-
pra note 84 (recommending the use of a clause that would specify the roles of credi-
tors and debtors in a restructuring scenario). It was not until a December 2002 speech
at the EMTA's annual meeting that Taylor used the term "engagement clause" to de-
scribe the provision he had earlier introduced. Taylor, supra note 82.
91 Taylor, supra note 84.
92 Taylor is only proposing that the clause bind all those bondholders within a
specific class of bonds; the clause would not bind creditors generally. Cf Part II.B
(proposing that an essential aspect of a new restructuring framework would be a sys-
tem by which a majority of creditors could bind minority creditors).
93 See Taylor, supra note 84 ("The representative, rather than individual bond-
holders, would have the power to initiate litigation ...."). This provision is condi-
tioned by the fact that the creditor's representative would have to act with the instruc-
tions of a certain percentage of bondholders. Id.
94 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (describing the IMF-supported ar-
rangement for addressing the minority holdout problem).
95 Though Taylor provided a brief description of the clause in his April 2002
speech, see Taylor, supra note 84 (outlining a clause proposal that would set aside a
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by which a sovereign country initiates the restructuring process.96 Ide-
ally, the sovereign would notify the creditor's representative (as de-
fined by the engagement clause), and the two groups would begin ne-
gotiating a restructured deal. The quicker the process can occur, the
more asset value will be protected. Significant coordination problems
remain, however. The sovereign must be given time to notify and
properly document the need for restructuring, while, at the same
time, the creditor's representative must determine its respective bar-
gaining position.
An interesting aspect of the Treasury Department's proposal con-
cerning the initiation clause is its suggestion that the parties may wish
to include a "cooling-off' period during which no litigation may be
initiated against the sovereign.97 This feature is similar to the stay pro-
vision in the IMF's SDRM plan,9s but its existence is curious in this
context. Its stated purpose is to prevent bondholders from initiating
litigation. However, as mentioned above, with the adoption of an en-
gagement clause, only the creditor's representative will have the
authority to initiate litigation.99 Treasury Department documents do
not clearly express the intent of this cooling-off period provision.
B. Reaction to Collective Action Clauses
Not surprisingly, some of the most poignant criticism of collective
action clauses comes from the IMF and its director, Anne Krueger.
Perhaps anticipating the Treasury Department proposal that was to
follow exactly one day after the SDRM proposal, Krueger launched a
period of time during which creditors could communicate with one another and de-
cide upon a course of action), he did not actually refer to it as an "initiation clause"
until the EMTA's annual meeting eight months later. Taylor, supra note 82.
96 Taylor, supra note 84.
97 See id. ("[T]here is a need for a 'cooling off' period[] between the date when
the sovereign notifies its creditors that it wants to restructure and the date that the
representative is chosen .... During this limited cooling off period, bondholders would
be prevented from initiating litigation.").
See KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 21-28 (describing the IMF's potential role within
a sovereign debt restructuring framework involving stay provisions); supra notes 57-59,
65-66 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements of the IMF's proposed stay
provision and the rationale behind it).
See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (suggesting that the engagement
clause specify a creditor representative who would negotiate on behalf of all the bond-
holders of a specific bond).
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preemptive, multifaceted attack against market-based approaches and
insisted that a statutory scheme was the only meaningful solution.'00
Krueger believes that, initially, it will be difficult to provide suffi-
cient incentives to encourage creditors and debtors to include collec-
tive action clauses voluntarily."' Under Secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs John Taylor rejects this criticism, but provides no
evidence to support his view. 102 The fact that the Treasury Depart-
ment's proposal was virtually identical to a 1996 proposal from the G-
10 that did not meet with much success 10 suggests that Krueger might
be right. Furthermore, evidence from emerging markets indicates the
reluctance of sovereigns to negotiate for these clauses out of fear that
•104
their implementation will increase borrowing costs.
One of Krueger's more effective criticisms is that collective action
clauses would be exceptionally limited in that they would only bind
bondholders within the corresponding issue." 5 If that is the case,
there are significant forms of debt, including bank loans, trade credit,
domestic debt, and official claims, that would escape the grasp of the
restructuring process.1°6 Failing to include these forms of debt creates
substantial uncertainty as to the resources available for any possible
restructuring. Considering that the Treasury Department's goal is to
maximize certainty in the restructuring process, this criticism proves
damning.
The above analysis did not escape the Treasury Department. While
it did not deny the potential problems, the Treasury Department
100 See KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 29-40 (arguing that a statutory framework is the
most effective mechanism for addressing collective action problems).
101 Id. at 32 ("[I]t can be expected that certain creditor groups would be particu-
larly reluctant to agree voluntarily to an arrangement whereby, for voting purposes,
their claims were aggregated with all other present or future creditors.").
102 See Taylor, supra note 82 (demonstrating support for collective action clauses
by enumerating all the countries that either are committed to using collective action
clauses or have made statements in favor of incorporating such clauses).
103 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting the possible regurgitation of
the 1996 G-10 plan).
104 In a recent article, Mexico's Finance Minister Francisco Gil Diaz bristled at the
suggestion that borrowing nations desired the inclusion of collective action clauses in
any bond instrument. Minister Diaz stated that no collective action clauses were in-
cluded in their most recent bond issued on September 17, 2002, and that Mexico had
never considered including such clauses in past bonds. Battling over the Bankrupt, supra
note 56, at 70.
105 KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 15.
106 See id. (explaining that, because majority restructuring provisions only bind
bondholders within the same issue, "they do not apply to other types of indebtedness,
such as bank claims and domestic debt").
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attempted to focus attention on the benefits of the program instead.
Importantly, though, the Treasury Department's proposal is not in-
tended to address all future sovereign debt crises; it is more limited in
scope. Indeed, the proposal is subject to broad criticism, primarily
because of its limited scope. The Treasury Department recognizes
that its proposal will not prevent all future sovereign debt crises and
that additional remedies are needed to address some of the larger,
more complex issues regarding sovereign debt.' °7 This limited solu-
tion, however, is easily incorporated, inexpensive, and a good first step
toward a resolution of future crises.°8
The SDRM proposal by the IMF and the collective action clauses
suggested by the Treasury Department highlight unique perspectives
about the way future sovereign debt crises should be handled and,
perhaps, avoided. However, the differences between the two propos-
als are not just procedural. Each organization is advocating an ap-
proach to restructuring foreign debt based on different underlying
beliefs about the purpose of bankruptcy law.'0 9
IV. COMPETING VALUES REPRESENTED IN BANKRUPTCY THEORY
Professor Douglas Baird believes that the debates surrounding
bankruptcy law are more than debates about the sufficiency of empiri-
cal evidence."0 Baird suggests that there is a more fundamental rea-
son why two major competing groups appear in the bankruptcy de-
bates that occur both in the practice and scholarship of the field. He
claims that the two groups start from different axioms and that their
107 See Taylor, supra note 84 (cautioning that "[t]his proposal for reform .. should
[be] viewed as an integral part of our broader strategy toward emerging markets"); see
also Taylor, supra note 82 (recognizing that the market-based approach is but a com-
ponent of the administration's overall emerging market strategy).
108 See Taylor, supra note 82 (suggesting that, because the clause approach is more
decentralized than the SDRM approach, the clause option could be implemented
more quickly and that, even if its scope is not as broad as the SDRM's, "if only a few
crises could be prevented, reforming the restructuring process should still be a high
priority").
109 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 975-80 (reviewing the conceptual foundation
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy law and arriving at "normative underpinnings" for a sover-
eign debt restructuring framework). Professor Steven Schwarcz's article provided the
animus for this Comment's use of Professor Douglas Baird's work to uncover the con-
ceptual foundations for the SDRM and the collective action clause models.
110 Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 573-74
(1998) ("[l]t would be a mistake to think that empirical studies [on bankruptcy law]
will do much to end the current debates.").
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respective positions reflect this difference.111 To understand the full
complexity of the sovereign debt restructuring debate, it is essential to
examine the respective plans of each side to see if their differences
also flow from different axioms. If they do, recognition of those dif-
ferences could lead to a more complete understanding of the debate.
Baird divides the divergent groups into two distinct camps. Mem-
bers of the first group are called traditionalists."' Traditionalists be-
lieve that laws regarding bankruptcy are unique and distinguishable
from other legal rules like those in tort or contract law.11 It is this
recognition of "important and distinctive" substantive goals that dis-
tinguishes the traditionalists.
1 4
Members of the second group, known as proceduralists, consist
"almost entirely of academics."'' 15 As their name indicates, procedural-
ists focus primarily on the procedural aspects of the restructuring pro-
cess, trying to minimize the perceived uniqueness of bankruptcy
rules."" For them, it is important that any restructuring order or
other mechanism be consistent with "the rest of the legal system" and
that bankruptcy laws fit into, and are cohesive with, "a vibrant market
, 17economy.01
Baird believes that the differences between these two distinct
camps can be demonstrated by the way each group would answer
three distinct questions because each group's answers reveal their un-
derlying values and beliefs. While each question will be examined in
detail below, an initial listing of the questions may be helpful. The
first question asks what role bankruptcy law should play in keeping a
III See id. at 574-75 (noting Baird's belief that the two divergent sets of axioms
"stem not from different political beliefs but rather from radically different views of the
underlying normative bases of the role of bankruptcy law and the aims of legal scholar-
ship").
112 Id. at 576.
113 Id.
114 Id. For a typical example of a traditionalist approach, see Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 796 (1987) (arguing that a bankruptcy distri-
bution scheme must address underlying substantive values by, for example, inquiring
into who is hurt when a business fails, whether those losses can be avoided, and at what
cost those losses should be avoided).
115 Baird, supra note 110, at 576.
116 See id. at 577-78 ("[T]raditionalists believe that bankruptcy law serves an impor-
tant purpose in rehabilitating firms that, but for bankruptcy protection, would fail
[while] ... proceduralists deny that bankruptcy can work any special magic.").
117 Id. at 577. For a typical example of a proceduralist approach, see Robert K.
Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 42 (contending that bankruptcy rules cannot remedy any existing inequality
through asset distribution).
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firm intact as a going concern. s1 8 This question involves the extent to
which bankruptcy rules should give "second chances" to troubled
firms. The second question involves the degree to which one can con-
sider bankruptcy a closed or open system. i 9 This question examines
the belief that rulings in bankruptcy have effects beyond those directly
connected to the participants in the pending case. The final question
inquires about the role the bankruptcy process should play in imple-
menting specific substantive policies.
1 20
Proceduralists adopt an extremely austere view of the world with
regard to what role bankruptcy law should play in keeping a firm in-
tact. Proceduralists have no interest in preserving any firm that can-S 121
not function in a competitive market. The laws governing reorgani-
zation simply cannot change the market reality that "[m]ost firms
fail."
122
For proceduralists, bankruptcy rules do have an important func-
tion in a market economy; however, the scope of that function is ex-
traordinarily narrow. Proceduralists often distinguish between eco-
nomic and financial distress.2 2 A firm is in economic distress if "it
cannot generate sufficient revenue to pay its debts."1 2 4 One example
of a firm in economic distress would be a firm unable to "succeed in
the marketplace, since competitors produce a better product at a lower
cost. ' '12' Economic distress would exist even if a firm had no creditors.
Financial distress is different in that it is directly related to the firm's
capital structure. 126 There are various reasons why otherwise well-
positioned firms experience financial distress, including large tort li-
abilities, incorrect future forecasts, and unforeseen events. 127 Thus, a
firm in financial distress encounters a temporary problem of being
unable to pay back what it has borrowed, while a firm in economic dis-
tress cannot compete in the marketplace.
"', Baird, supra note 110, at 577.
119 Id. at 579.
120 Id. at 577-79.
1 See id. at 580 (noting that, under the proceduralist view, "[k] eeping firms intact
that cannot effectively compete results in more harm than good over the long run").
122 Id.
123 Id. at 580-81.
124 Id. at 580.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 581 ("Financial distress exists only if a firm has creditors. If the credi-
tors disappeared, the problem would disappear and the firm would thrive.").
127 See id. (remarking that an effectively managed firm may still experience "huge
tort liabilities" and cost overruns).
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Addressing the role that bankruptcy should play in keeping a firm
intact, proceduralists are only willing to extend the protection of the
law to firms experiencing financial distress.1 28 In the complex world
of corporate financial management, even well-managed firms can ex-
perience periods of illiquidity. It is during these times that society,
through reorganization procedures, can protect the asset values of the
firm and keep the firm intact. On the other hand, firms experiencing
economic distress should not be extended protection. Proceduralists
believe that these firms should be left subject to market forces because
the market has determined them to be inadequate.9 There is no rea-
son to keep such a firm intact.
Traditionalists often fail to differentiate between economic and
financial distress. For traditionalists, protecting a business through
bankruptcy rules serves an independent good. A business is not just a
balance sheet; a business is also a distributor of wages for its employ-
ees, a source of trade for its suppliers, and often a provider of services
to a community. When a business closes, the costs to these groups are
substantial. Traditionalists argue that, if bankruptcy laws allow credi-
tors to easily dismantle a firm "in pursuit of their narrow self-
interests"13 0 (i.e., recovery of their loans), these laws will discount the
social costs associated with the closing of a business. Therefore, tra-
ditionalists argue, bankruptcy laws should be used more liberally to
give firms a "second chance" and serve as a bulwark to the harshness
of market forces. 32 This recommendation does not mean to imply
that every firm should be prevented from failing but that the dis-
tressed firm should be given every opportunity to succeed.
Baird's second inquiry asks whether bankruptcy should be consid-
ered a closed or open system. 3 Generally, this question is designed
to determine the extent to which traditionalists and proceduralists
believe that the rules of bankruptcy and decisions of bankruptcy
courts have effects beyond the immediate case or controversy.
128 Id.
129 In the corporate context, leaving economically distressed entities to market
forces will generally result in the liquidation of the firm. This idea is captured in
Baird's summation of the proceduralist's perspective: "A market economy works when
firms that cannot compete effectively are allowed to fail." Id. at 582.
130 Id. at 583.
131 Id. at 582-83.
132 Id.
153 Id. at 578.
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Proceduralists believe that bankruptcy rules affect behavior else-
where, particularly the investment decisions of creditors. 34 For exam-
ple, consider the traditionalist goal of creating breathing room for dis-
tressed firms, potentially giving them a second chance at success,
despite their inability to meet their current obligations. From the
proceduralist perspective, this second chance comes at the expense of
the creditors, who, but for the bankruptcy proceeding, could liquidate
the firm and force a transfer of assets.
According to proceduralists, the traditionalist position also nega-
tively implicates the consistency of the legal system. 3 5 If worthy, inde-
pendent, substantive values really do exist in bankruptcy law, why are
these values absent from other areas of the law?136 If the traditionalist
approach can prevent creditors from liquidating a firm because of
concerns regarding the impact on the community, why do judges not
have the authority to prevent an individual firm owner from closing
down a business or relocating? The impact on the community is po-
tentially the same; however, the law will not interfere with the business
owners' rights to close their establishments. Proceduralists ask why
the law should interfere with the creditors' rights to engage in analo-
gous acts.
Initially, traditionalists respond by arguing that sparse evidence
exists that bankruptcy rules affect investors' decisions ex ante."17 If in-
vestors' decisions are not affected, then there is little need to factor in
their interests when determining the proper outcome in a bankruptcy
proceeding. More important for the traditionalists is a balancing of
the interests among the parties before the court. Traditionalists do
not seek to deny the interests of creditors. However, as just discussed,
traditionalists weigh the other side of the scale more heavily because
they recognize the social costs created by failing firms. Therefore,
judges in bankruptcy proceedings should be able to craft decisions
that balance the interests of the parties before them and should not
be overly concerned with the effects that their rulings may have on in-
vestors.
Traditionalists also reject the proceduralists' calls for consistency
as "disingenuous.,'13 They argue that a bankruptcy proceeding is not
134 Id. at 581-82.
See id. at 590 ("Traditionalists support a type of judicial intervention ... that
legal scholars do not encounter elsewhere.").
136 Id.
37 Id. at 578.
Id. at 592.
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simply a process to ensure that markets are properly functioning.
39
Divergent interests need to be balanced. Therefore, the judge in such
a proceeding should keep nonmarket objectives in mind.140 This
point leads the discussion into the final question posed to differenti-
ate the two camps.
The proceduralist sees the bankruptcy process as long, costly, and
devoid of any equivalent offsetting benefit. The dangers of a pro-
longed bankruptcy proceeding include increased litigation and uncer-
tainty for future investors. The process should be short and sweet.
For the proceduralists, "negotiations among the interested parties...
are costs to be avoided."142 The judge should function only as a disin-
terested arbitrator. There should be a process to ensure disclosure of
relevant information and a vetting of parties' biases, but the ultimate
outcome should not be left to the judge.1 43 The outcome should be
left to the creditors and debtor, withoutjudicial interference.
The traditionalist does not have such a negative view regarding
the bankruptcy process. In fact, for traditionalists, "the process is itself
one of the great virtues of bankruptcy law.' ' 44 Through this process
all the parties involved are able to congregate for purposes of discuss-
ing and negotiating the situation, the judge is able to cajole compro-
mises, and the substantive goals of bankruptcy can be advanced. The
process is of essential importance for traditionalists. According to
their theory,judges must be given the discretion to craft creative solu-
tions to problems created by "rich and textured facts." 145 No formu-
laic method of bankruptcy that failed to account for the uniqueness of
each bankruptcy case would be sufficient for dealing with restructur-
ing. Thus, the judge, in the traditionalist model, is more than a disin-
terested arbitrator. The 'judge is a shepherd, whose job it is to push
the flock in the desired direction."46
139 See id. (noting traditionalists' belief that proceduralists place too much faith in
economic forces).
140 See id. ("Bankruptcy judges should have aims in mind other than ensuring that
markets work effectively.").
141 Id. at 593.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 579.
144 Id. at 593.
145 Id. at 579.
146 Id.
STA TUTORY OR CONTRACTUAL SOLFUTION?
V. ANALYSIS OF THE VALUES PRESENT IN THE SDRM
AND COLLECTWVE ACTION CLAUSES
To uncover some of the values present in the IMF and Treasury
Department proposals, I will examine each proposal keeping in mind
the differences between traditionalist and proceduralist views regard-
ing the role of bankruptcy law.
47
The two competing views regarding the role of bankruptcy law in
keeping a firm intact cannot be directly transplanted to issues of sov-
ereign debt. The inquiry must be altered slightly to account for sov-
ereign debt's unique problems. For example, no country can be liq-
uidated by its creditors, and so countries unable to satisfy their debts
will nonetheless be "left intact," so to speak. Although the formal
rules of bankruptcy cannot account for this difference, the underlying
views of traditionalists and proceduralists illuminate and provide fresh
perspectives on the two sovereign debt proposals.
The proponents of collective action clauses appear only minimally
concerned with taking an active role in supporting a sovereign's ef-
forts to maintain solvency. Collective action clauses focus on resolving
an immediate dispute between the debtor country and a limited
group of creditors. As explained above, they are extraordinarily re-
stricted in their applicability; 48 they do not apply to many other forms
of debt that may constitute the true cause of the country's liquidity
problems. The Treasury Department admits that collective action
clauses do not address "other potential sources of financial crises.''149
This approach remains content to allow the market to dictate the
terms of the reorganization and, by dictating the terms, the ultimate
outcome.
This stance is consistent with the proceduralist position regard-
ing the role of bankruptcy. If indeed "[a]ll bankruptcy can do is en-
sure that fights among creditors.., do not accelerate.., liquida-
tion," 50 then there is no need for an elaborate international court of
147 The novelty of my analysis is to utilize Baird's work to deconstruct two compet-
ing sovereign debt restructuring proposals. Other scholarship has examined Baird's
theories to supplement an alternative to these two competing proposals. See generally
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 975-80 (utilizing bankruptcy theory to develop a normative
framework for an alternative method of dealing with the problem of sovereign debt
restructuring).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (describing Anne Krueger's criticism
that collective action clauses prove particularly limited).
149 Taylor, supra note 82.
150 Baird, supra note 110, at 578.
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bankruptcy. While the Treasury Department approach does not ad-
vocate liquidating a country, it does not seem overly concerned with
protecting it from harsh market forces. In fact, this approach lauds
the market as the only accurate way to price the risk of restructur-
ing. 5' The idea that restructuring rules work best when they interfere
only minimally with the international financial market parallels a
purely proceduralist approach to bankruptcy. 15
The SDRM, on the other hand, answers this basic question quite
differently. It sees a different role for the reorganization process.
The SDRM is described as an approach that will "pav[e] the way to-
ward an agreement that helps the debtor return to viability and
growth.' 5 3 The SDRM wants to protect the "national ... prosperity"
of the debtor nation in addition to asset values and creditors' rights.
1
5
4
There is a clear understanding throughout the IMF proposal that the
costs considered during the restructuring process were not restricted
to the financial recalculations of debt. Indeed, there is a distinct rec-
ognition of the role an international bankruptcy court could play in
minimizing the harshness of market forces. 5 5 Just as traditionalists
want to give breathing room to troubled firms, the SDRM, through
stay provisions and priority financing, would provide temporary assis-
tance to debtor nations. 56 This assistance is not something provided
for in the collective action clauses.
In considering whether bankruptcy should be a closed or open sys-
tem, each approach seems again to suggest a different answer. The pro-
ponents of collective action clauses have no doubt that the bankruptcy
proceeding has ex ante effects on investors. In fact, the entire argu-
ment for collective action clauses seems to center around improving,
ex ante, investors' decisions. As stated above, the goal of collective ac-
tion clauses is to create certainty regarding the restructuring process.157
151 See Taylor, supra note 82 (suggesting that "[t]he lack of a clear, well-defined
process for sovereign debt workouts... prevents the market from accurately pricing
the risk of a restructuring event"); supra text accompanying notes 84-85 (noting the
Treasury Department's faith in the market system that translates into a proposal that
would leave the terms of the process up to the individual creditors and debtor na-
tions).
152 See Baird, supra note 110, at 587 ("For [proceduralists], bankruptcy law works
best when it interferes as little as possible with the operation of markets.").
53 KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 2.
154 Id. at 21.
See id. at 4 (commenting that a properly designed SDRM would increase the
efficiency of the international capital market).
156 Id. at 25-28.
157 Supra text accompanying notes 84-89 and p. 1502.
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This goal is important because uncertainty "impedes broader participa-
tion in the markets.'' 58 In effect, uncertainty "prevents the market
from accurately pricing the risk" of default. 15 This market-based ap-
proach focuses on the belief that bankruptcy is an open system and
that any regulations governing restructuring will significantly impact
decisions made elsewhere.
The SDRM approach to whether sovereign restructuring should
be an open or closed system does not fit neatly into either the tradi-
tionalist or proceduralist camp, although it appears to favor the tradi-
tionalist side. The reason the SDRM is not wholly traditional in its
approach is that it seems to recognize and place importance on ex
ante effects."'° For instance, its advocates posit that proper implemen-
tation of the SDRM would result in benefits such as an increased effi-
ciency of the international capital market and a better global alloca-
tion of capital, effects primarily due to the SDRM's more reliable
procedural mechanisms. 6 ' The fact that the proponents identify these
benefits prevents them from taking a completely traditionalist per-
spective.
The SDRM does a much better job at "employing the idea of 'bal-
ance.""'62 Although the improved efficiency of the markets is recog-
nized, it is the last benefit listed in a group of benefits that also in-
cludes allowing the debtor to avoid severe economic dislocation and
preserving official reserves. 63 The sole aim of the SDRM is not to es-
tablish a framework that provides more information to a captive audi-
ence of investors. Rather, it contemplates that the rules governing re-
organization should do more than ensure that markets work
efficiently. This view, then, seems more consistent with the tradition-
alist approach than it first appeared.
The final question involves a determination of the role that the
process of reorganization plays in implementing substantive policies.
The Treasury Department's approach on this question is unabashedly
proceduralist. As Baird explains, proceduralists believe that "parties
[in bankruptcy] have to make their own decisions; the judge is not
to make choices for them. Rather than being committed to any
158 Taylor, supra note 82.
159 Id.
1Fo See Baird, supra note 110, at 589 (stating that "traditionalists do not even di-
rectly discuss ex ante effects").
161 KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 5.
:62 Baird, supra note 110, at 589.
163 KRUEGER, supra note 39, at 5.
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particular outcome, the judge should control the process to ensure
that ... all relevant information is gathered and disclosed."
64
The Treasury Department approach allows debtors and creditors
to negotiate and decide how any restructuring would take place be-
fore funds are transferred. Even the details regarding collective ac-
tion clauses would be "determined by the borrowers and lenders.",
65
There would be nothing for a judge to do in such a case but act as a
"disinterested arbitrator. " 166 Giving discretion to a judge is seen as an
unnecessary cost. Consequently, this provision would be inconsistent
with the SDRM.
The SDRM creates an elaborate framework within which claims
and issues can be raised and settled. It does not reduce the sovereign
restructuring process to limited ex ante negotiations. While collective
action clauses can be helpful in guiding future decisions regarding re-
structuring, they cannot account for the "rich and textured facts ' 167 of
any particular case. This aspect of the framework is one of the
SDRM's proudest achievements because it is this well-defined, well-
established process (not outcome) that will prevent future economic
crises.
VI. THE VALUE ADDED BY THE TRADITIONALIST APPROACH
With a small degree of manipulation, the previous Part has dem-
onstrated that the traditionalists' views are captured in the IMF's
SDRM proposal. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the
SDRM contemplates and addresses the concerns of traditionalists to a
greater extent than the collective action clause proposals. The follow-
ing questions remain, though: Will a bankruptcy scheme that con-
templates traditionalist values assist sovereign nations in restructuring
their debt? Perhaps, more importantly, is such a scheme workable?
The answer to both questions is uncertain, but a further examination
of traditionalist philosophy assists in demonstrating the value added
by the SDRM approach.
:64 Baird, supra note 110, at 579 (emphasis added).
65 Taylor, supra note 84.166 See supra text accompanying note 143 (discussing the role of the judge in a pro-
ceduralist framework).
167 Baird, supra note 110, at 579.
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Central to the traditionalists' theory is the notion that bankruptcy
is fundamentally a legal system of distribution.'"8 Bankruptcy law as-
sumes (whether true or not) that a debtor cannot repay its creditors.
This assumption contrasts with the underlying theory behind state col-
lection law, which tends to focus on "debtor-versus-creditor" dis-
putes. 169  More frequently, disputes in bankruptcy are not debtor-
versus-creditor, but rather "creditor-versus-creditor." 70 Based on the
assumptions of bankruptcy law, there is not enough money to go
around. Therefore, bankruptcy law by necessity distributes those lim-
ited assets among various creditors. Who gets paid and how much
they get paid are policy considerations based on a variety of normative
issues. Bankruptcy law cannot, therefore, be watered down to a sim-
ple debtor-versus-creditor analysis. Nevertheless, this analysis seems to
be the only one involved in the collective action clause approach.
Although Professor Elizabeth Warren does not articulate all of the
distributional goals sought to be protected by bankruptcy law, her
brief description is sufficient for present purposes. The distribution
of debtors' assets is determined based on a consideration of the fol-
lowing issues: relative ability to bear the costs of default, incentive ef-
fects on pre-bankruptcy transactions, similarities among creditors, and
benefits to the bankruptcy estate.
7'
Moreover, Warren recognizes that, when Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Code, it was not solely concerned with the relationship of
a debtor to its unpaid creditors. 72 Accordingly, Warren believes that
Congress sought to "'protect the investing public, protect jobs, and
help save troubled businesses."1 73 At the time of its enactment, the
Code contemplated concerns regarding the community impact of
bankruptcy, as well as the public interest beyond the interests of the disputing
parties. 1
74
168 See Warren, supra note 114, at 785 ("Distribution among creditors is not inci-
dental to other concerns; it is the center of the bankruptcy scheme.").
169 See id. (describing the different assumptions of bankruptcy law and state collec-
tion law and how each deals with the problem of creditors and debtors).
170 Id.
See id. at 791-92 (examining how the Bankruptcy Code seeks to establish credi-
tor priority).
72 See id. at 788 (reviewing some of Congress's considerations in drafting the Bank-
ruptcy Code).
3 Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards)).
See id. ("Congressional comments on the Bankruptcy Code... indicate clear
recognition of the larger implications of a debtor's widespread default ... ").
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With these concerns in mind, proponents of collective action
clauses raise problematic arguments because they tend to focus so
much on the debtor-creditor controversy and thereby overlook the
normative distributional goals inherent in any form of restructuring
law. As stated above, the proponents of the SDRM recognize that
the central concern of any reorganization approach should be to pro-
tect the "national ... prosperity" of the debtor nation in addition
to asset values and creditors' rights.' 5  The "community impact of
bankruptcy""7 , that troubled Congress is magnified in a discussion of
sovereign debt restructuring. Not a community, but a country, will be
affected by the procedure implemented by the international commu-
nity. Any procedure that focuses on the conflict between the debtor
and the creditor will marginalize the interests of the "community" and
potentially exacerbate the very problems that caused the sovereign to
default in the first place. Sovereign debt is not analogous to corpo-
rate debt in form or scope. To address the problem of sovereign debt
restructuring as contractual, rather than distributional, ignores these
differences.
CONCLUSION
Sovereign debt restructuring is a problem that has been ignored
for quite some time. The flexibility of sovereign financing and the
availability of funds from intergovernmental organizations have
minimized the severity of the problem. However, as markets grow
more integrated and criticisms of bailouts increase, avoidance of this
problem may no longer be possible.
The position of the United States government has temporarily
pushed the SDRM off the table in favor of a contract-based solution.
Going forward, as questions arise regarding both the details of im-
plementation and the effectiveness of the contractual approach, it is
important to consider the substantial disagreement surrounding the
proper role that reorganization rules should play in the legal system.
In particular, focus should be placed on the impact of reducing the
importance of normative distributional goals in the sovereign debt re-
structuring context.
This debate does not revolve around semantics. There are sub-
stantive differences between the two proposals, differences that may
175 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the SDRM's
goals).
176 Warren, supra note 114, at 788.
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be influenced by conflicting philosophies regarding bankruptcy law.
Focusing too much on the debtor-versus-creditor conflict could poten-
tially limit the overall effectiveness of any restructuring plan because it
does not address the rich complexity of sovereign debt.
* * * * * *
